Response by DeGrazia, David
Squadrito: Commentary 
generally do more violence "to a human's plans than it 
would to the totality ofthings the dog would want to do," 
as though the dog were not already captive. Since, in 
general, white males tend to do more various types of 
important things than blacks and women, we might as 
well conclude that they have a higher moral status. 
We may deem some interests to be more important 
than other interests, but I doubt that this is based on 
any objective criterion. To consider our own interests 
and opportunities more important and central in some 
cosmic sense is an elitist position that I cannot defend. 
To contend that normal people have a higher moral 
status than people who are not normal, to refer to such 
people as defective or as marginal cases, to contend 
that some animals have a higher moral status than some 
people, is, I think, the height of egotism. To suggest 
that the interests of a normal dolphin may be more 
important than those of an elderly, retarded human is 
an affront to human dignity. To contend that this is all 
very objective and based on detached reflection is to 
fool ourselves; philosophers give a sceptical eye to 
scientists who make such claims. That we are not 
dealing with pure objectivity is evidenced by the 
constant appeal to intuition. 
DeGrazia points out that the intuition persists that 
the killing ofa human is more destructive of something 
objectively valuable than the killing ofan animal. What 
kind of intuition is this? My guess is that it is based on 
a long history of speciesism, based primarily on our 
desperate desire to be important and powerful in a 
universe that cares as much about us as it does a flea. 
The terms "higher moral status" and "higher value" are 
usually connected to some capitalist idea ofproductivity 
and usefulness to those in power. That our total 
obsession with hierarchies and ranking is destructive 
to all life has been demonstrated in numerous works. 
Giving all sentient beings equal moral status would 
not solve the ethical dilemmas with regard to extreme 
cases. We are all worried about a philosophical frame-
work which would throw us off a lifeboat. I would not 
throw a human being overboard in favor of a dog, not 
for DeGrazia's reasons, but simply because I selfIshly 
value humans more. I do not believe that our choices 
in these situations are justified by any ethical theory. 
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Let me briefly respond to Professor Squadrito's 
thoughtful commentary on my paper. Space precludes 
treating all of the objections, and I will honor none of 
the ad hominem remarks. To begin, I did not conclude 
that the use ofanimals in research is justified. The thesis 
was conditional and took this form: If research that 
harms animals is to be done at all, then such-and-such 
is, generally, a reason to prefer the use of animals over 
humans. For all I have asserted, Regan's view might 
be right, for it is compatible with the claim that normal 
humans and normal animals differ in moral status; 
indeed, his view implies this thesis with respect to life-
interests. The truth is that I think a range of views are 
within reason and that each view within this range is 
compatible with the theses I advance, but I do not know 
which is correct 
Additionally, to be precise, I did not even argue that 
humans generally have greater moral status than 
animals, but rather that there is good reason to think so. 
This more modest claim is in keeping with my purposes, 
because my major objectives are (1) to distinguish the 
concepts ofequal consideration and equal moral status 
and (2) to prove that the principle ofequal consideration 
does not entail equality of moral status. These 
objectives are accomplished if it is shown that there is 
good reason to think there are differences in moral status 
while assuming the principle of equal consideration. I 
fmd it odd that Squadrito never comments on my two 
major theses. 
However, I do, in fact, believe that there are 
differences in moral status. To deny this thesis is to 
accept fairly staggering implications, e.g., that there is 
no more reason, ethically, to save a human person in a 
"lifeboat situation" than to save a trout-that, given an 
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eql,l8.1 presumption against sacrificing either, it would 
not be wrong to sacrifice the human. (Never mind that 
trout swim and do not weigh much.) Trying to be as 
objective as possible, I simply cannot believe this. 
Although I think the judgment is explicable in terms 
of interests, it is true that I employ intuition here, for 
what controls my thinking on this point is a very 
persistent pretheoretical moral judgment I do not think 
this is reason for epistemologicalembarrassment·Given 
that the question of whether two beings have equal 
moral status makes sense, it demands an answer. In 
comparing the values of lives (as opposed to, e.g., two 
cases of suffering, in which we can try to compare 
phenomenological events), our tools for analysis are 
very limited, and it is not clear how we can avoid some 
appeal to pretheoretical judgments. Again, I think 
maximizing interests can yield the same answer (and 
one need not be a utilitarian to endorse such thinking in 
such cases), but I think intuition is at least as solid as 
any particular theoretical commitment in this murky 
normative terrain. 
Moreover, I think it is radically misguided to criticize 
intuitions categorically. It is worth noting that all moral 
philosophers-and I mean all-employ intuition in 
developing or testing their views. And as I have argued 
extensively elsewhere (in ch. 3 of my dissertation), 
some use of intuition is not only epistemologically 
respectable but, if rationalism is false (as I argue), 
actually necessary. The art is to distinguish pretheo-
retical moral judgments that are worthy ofrespect from 
the frauds. In the present case I acknowledge the 
fallibility of my use of intuition, but I point out that one 
who disagrees with me must either reject my intuition 
or else account for it in a way that does not imply 
differences in moral status. Squadrito attempts the latter, 
stating that she would not sacrifice a human over a dog, 
but claims that choices in such situations are justified 
by no ethical theory, while hers is made for selfish 
reasons. Of course, this implies that, as far as ethics 
goes, it would be permissible to sacrifice the htiman 
over the dog (say, if one's selfish concerns leaned the 
other way}-and, given her suggestion that all sentient 
beings have equal moral status, a human over a trout. 
This, again, I simply cannot believe. And if one's 
judgments here cannotbejustifiedby any ethical theory 
(presently articulated or not), I do not understand in 
what sense they command any respect. 
I think Squadrito's criticisms are most helpful with 
respect to two issues with which I think I have genuine 
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difficulty. First, if differences in moral status appear 
with respect to freedom and life, is it not the case that 
humans generally differ from each other in moral status? 
I am as dissatisfied with this putative implication as 
are most people. But I think it is critical that differences 
in the relevant characteristics among humans are 
generally quite small compared to the relevant 
differences between most humans and most animals. 
(Remember that I assert relevant differences primarily 
with respect to life, to a lesser extent and with 
qualifications with respect to freedom, and not with 
respect to other interests.) I acknowledge inequalities 
in moral status only where the relevant differences are 
very pronounced, a move that is attractive at least for 
practical reasons, possibly also for theoretical reasons. 
But differences among humans are sometimes very 
pronounced, bringing us to another area where I am 
unsure what to argue: the problem of marginal cases. I 
do not think anyone has provided a truly adequate 
solution to this problem. I think that, in response to it, 
one should probably either (1) adopt a position like 
Regan's (which I have not precluded but suspect is too 
restrictive), (2) appeal to the side-effects of using 
humans, who, due to extensive communication, are far 
more affected by what happens to conspecifics than are 
animals, or (3) confer rights of protection on members 
of the community whom we so wish to protect 
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